

דף יומי • בכורות • דף י'

Daf Yomi • The Full Daf • Elucidated Talmud • Navy & Gold Edition • with Rashi

THE SUGYA

We begin the daf by delving deeper into Rabbi Shimon's shitta regarding food impurity (tum'as ochlin) and forbidden benefits. The Gemara first questions why Rabbi Shimon needs the concept of a "period of fitness" to explain why meat cooked in milk can contract tumah, since he holds that one may derive benefit from meat cooked in milk, meaning it could simply be fed to a non-Jew. The Gemara answers that the Tanna is employing a "one and furthermore" style of argument to give multiple reasons.

From there, the shakla v'tarya moves into a fascinating discussion regarding a firstborn donkey whose neck was broken (arifah). Rava attempts to bring a raaya from here regarding whether Rabbi Shimon permits benefit after arifah. This leads the Gemara into a deep lomdishe analysis of whether we say "its prohibition is its intent" (issuroo hi b'vaso)—meaning, does the Torah's very prohibition of an item make it significant enough to be considered "food" without explicit human intent? We analyze various Mishnayos regarding non-kosher carcasses and kosher birds in villages to see if the Rabbis or Rabbi Shimon hold of this rule.

All introductions, summaries, and contextual notes are the editor's commentary and are not part of the original text.

עמוד א' DAF 10A

QUESTION

אי הכי, בשר בחלב מאי איריא דהיתיה לה שעת הכושר?

The Gemara asks: **If so**, that Rabbi Shimon holds that any food from which benefit is forbidden cannot contract food impurity, then regarding **meat cooked in milk**, **why** does he **specifically** argue that it is susceptible to impurity because **it had a period of fitness** before they were cooked together?

QUESTION

תיפוק לי דאוכל שאתה יכול להאכילו לאחרים הוא!

Let this halacha **derive for me** from the fact **that it is food that you can feed to others**, namely to non-Jews, since Rabbi Shimon holds that deriving benefit from meat cooked in milk is permitted!

PROOF

דתנאי, רבי שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום רבי שמעון: בשר בחלב אסור באכילה ומותר בהנאה,

As it is taught in a braisa: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Meat cooked in milk is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit,

PROOF

שנאמר: "כי עם קדוש אתה לה' אלהיך", ולהלן הוא אומר: "ואנשי קדש תהיון לי",

as it is stated regarding meat in milk: "For you are a holy people to Hashem your Elokim; you shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk," and elsewhere regarding a tereifah it says: "And you shall be holy men to Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by animals in the field."

PROOF

מה להלן אסור באכילה ומוותר בהנאה, אף כאן אסור באכילה ומוותר בהנאה!

Just as there, by a tereifah, it is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit, so too here, by meat in milk, it is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit. If so, it is fit to feed to non-Jews, so why did Rabbi Shimon need the reason of "a period of fitness"?

ANSWER

תדא ועוד קאמר:

The Gemara answers: The Tanna of the braisa is stating a "one and furthermore" argument, giving two reasons why it is susceptible to impurity:

ANSWER

תדא — דאזכל שאפתה יכול להאכילו לאחרים הוא,

One reason is that it is food that you can feed to others, i.e., non-Jews, since benefit is permitted,

ANSWER

ועוד — לדידיה נמי הרי היתה לו שעת הכושר.

and furthermore, even for him, the Jew himself who is forbidden to eat it now, behold, it had a period of fitness before they were cooked together, which keeps it in the category of food.

STATEMENT

ואם איתא דלאחר עריפה שרי רבי שמעון, ליתני: ומודה רבי שמעון בפטר חמור ובשר בחלב שמטמאין טומאת אוכלין!

Rava continues his proof: And if it is so, that after the breaking of the neck of a firstborn donkey Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit, let the Tanna teach: "And Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of a firstborn donkey and meat cooked in milk, that they contract food impurity!" Since the Tanna did not list the firstborn donkey as an exception, Rabbi Shimon must hold that benefit is forbidden after its neck is broken.

ANSWER

אי דחשיב עליה — הכי נמי;

The Gemara responds: If we are dealing with a case where he had intent for it to be eaten, indeed so, Rabbi Shimon would agree that it is susceptible to food impurity.

ANSWER

הכא במאי עסקינן — דלא חשיב עליה.

But here we are dealing with a case where he did not have intent for it to be eaten. Since donkey meat is not standard food, it requires explicit intent to be considered food, and without it, it cannot contract impurity.

QUESTION

וְטַעַמָּא מַאי מְטַמְּאֵי רַבָּנָן?

The Gemara asks: **But** if so, **what is the reason the Rabbis render it susceptible to impurity** even without explicit intent?

ANSWER

אֲמַרוּהָ רַבָּנָן קָמִיָּה דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הוּאֵיל וְאִיסוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ.

The Rabbis said before Rav Sheshet: **Since its prohibition is its intent.** The very fact that the Torah forbade it makes it significant, which stands in place of explicit intent to eat it.

QUESTION

וְלִרְבָּנָן מִי אָמַר הוּאֵיל וְאִיסוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ?

The Gemara asks: **But according to the Rabbis, do we say "since its prohibition is its intent"?**

OBJECTION

וְהָאֵתְנָן: שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דְּבָרִים אָמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן — צְרִיכָה מְחֻשְׁבָּה, וְאֵינָה צְרִיכָה הַכָּשֶׁר.

But didn't we learn in a Mishnah: **Thirteen matters they said regarding the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: It requires intent** to eat it in order to contract food impurity, **but it does not require preparation** by coming into contact with liquid.

OBJECTION

וְאִי אִיסוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לָמָּה לִי מְחֻשְׁבָּה?

And if you say **its prohibition is its intent, why do I need intent** here? It is a forbidden carcass, so its prohibition should automatically make it food!

ANSWER

הָאֵתְנָן? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.

The Gemara answers: **Whose opinion is this** Mishnah? **It is Rabbi Shimon**, who does not hold of this rule.

QUESTION

תָּא שְׁמַע: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בְּכָל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּכִּפּוּרִים — צְרִיכִים מְחֻשְׁבָּה, וְאֵינָם צְרִיכִים הַכָּשֶׁר.

The Gemara suggests: **Come and hear** a proof from another Mishnah: **The carcass of a non-kosher animal in any place, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal in the villages** where people do not usually eat them, **require intent** to eat them to contract food impurity, **but they do not require preparation** by liquid.

QUESTION

וְאִי אָמַרְתָּ אִיסוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לָמָּה לִי מְחֻשְׁבָּה?

And if you say **its prohibition is its intent, why do I need intent**? They are all forbidden foods!

ANSWER

הא מני? רבי שמעון היא.

The Gemara answers: **Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Shimon.**

QUESTION

תא שמע: נבלת בהמה טהורה בכל מקום, ונבלת עוף הטהור והחלב בפשווקים — אינן צריכין מחשבה ולא הכשר.

The Gemara suggests: **Come and hear** a proof from the continuation of that Mishnah: **The carcass of a kosher animal in any place, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat in the marketplaces of cities where some people eat them, do not require intent nor preparation.**

QUESTION

הא טמאה בעיא מחשבה.

We infer from here: **But** the carcass of a **non-kosher** animal **requires intent**. If the rule "its prohibition is its intent" is accepted by the Rabbis, why does it require intent?

QUESTION

וכי תימא: הא מני רבי שמעון היא — הא מדיסיפא רבי שמעון הוי, רישא לאו רבי שמעון.

And if you should say: **Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Shimon** — but since the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon, it implies that the first clause is not Rabbi Shimon, but rather the Rabbis!

QUESTION

דקתני סיפא: רבי שמעון אומר: אף הגמל והארנבת והשפן והחזיר אינן צריכין לא מחשבה ולא הכשר.

As the latter clause teaches: **Rabbi Shimon says: Even the camel, the hare, the rock badger, and the pig do not require either intent or preparation.**

QUESTION

ואמר רבי שמעון: מה טעם? הואיל ויש בהן סימני טהרה.

And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? Since they have some signs of purity, they are already considered food. This proves that the first clause is the Rabbis, and yet they require intent for non-kosher carcasses, meaning they do not hold "its prohibition is its intent"!

RESOLUTION

אלא אמר רבא: דכולי עלמא לא אמרינן איסורו חישובו,

Rather, Rava said: **Everyone agrees we do not say "its prohibition is its intent."**

RESOLUTION

ואי דערפיה מיערף — הכי נמי,

And if we are dealing with a case **where he broke its neck**, which is the Torah's command for a firstborn donkey, **indeed so**, it would not contract impurity without intent, even according to the Rabbis.

עמוד ב' DAF 10B

ANSWER

הָכָא בְּמַאי עֲסָקִינוּ? כְּגוֹן שְׁשֶׁחֱטוּ לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ,

Here in the Mishnah **with what** case **are we dealing?** We are dealing with a case **such as** where he **slaughtered** the firstborn donkey **to teach himself with it** how to properly perform shechitah, and not to eat it,

EXPLANATION

וּבְכַלּוּגְתָּא דְּנִימוֹס וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

and they argue **in the dispute of Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer** regarding whether the prohibition of an animal serves as its "intent" to be treated as food.

BRAISA

דִּתְנִינָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסִי: סָח לִי נִימוֹס, אָחִיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הַגָּרְסִי, שֶׁהִשְׁוִיחַ אֶת הָעוֹרֵב לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ — דָּמוֹ מְכַשֵּׁיר.

As it is taught in a braisa, **Rabbi Yosei said:** Nimos, the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi, related to me, that one who **slaughters a crow to teach himself with it** how to slaughter, **its blood renders** other foods **susceptible** to tumah.

BRAISA

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דָּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מְכַשֵּׁיר.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood of slaughter always renders foods susceptible to tumah.

QUESTION

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיָּינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא!

The Gemara asks: But the ruling of **Rabbi Eliezer** is identical to that of **the first Tanna**, Nimos! Both agree that the blood of this shechitah is machshir.

ANSWER

אֲלָא לָאוּ אִיסוּרוֹ חִישׁוּבוֹ אֵיפָא בִּינֵיהוּ.

Rather, is it not that the question of whether **its prohibition** serves as **its intent** to be food is the difference **between them?**

EXPLANATION

תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: דָּמוֹ מְכַשֵּׁיר לְעוֹלָם, אֲבָל לְגוֹפִיָּה בְּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.

The first Tanna, Nimos, **holds** that **its blood renders** other foods **susceptible** to tumah **generally**, but for the crow **itself** to become tamei as food, it **requires** explicit **intent** to eat it, because the prohibition does not make it food.

EXPLANATION

וְאַתָּא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמִימַר: דָּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מְכַשֵּׁיר, וְאַפִּילוּ לְגוֹפִיָּה נָמִי לָא בְּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.

And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that the blood of slaughter always renders foods susceptible, and even for the crow itself it also does not require explicit intent, because its prohibition serves as the intent to make it food.

OBJECTION

ממאי? דילמא טעמא דרבני אליעזר הוה — דשאני עורב, הואיל ויש בו סימני טהרה.

The Gemara objects: From where do we know this? Perhaps the reason of Rabbi Eliezer there is that a crow is different, since it has some signs of taharah, and therefore it is automatically considered food without needing intent.

QUESTION

ומנלן דסימני טהרה מילתא היא?

And from where do we know that signs of taharah are a significant matter regarding food tumah?

PROOF

דקתני עלה דההיא, אמר רבי שמעון: מה טעם? הואיל ויש בו סימני טהרה.

As it is taught on that Mishnah, Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason that camel meat is susceptible to tumah? Since it has some signs of taharah.

QUESTION

וכי תימא: אי משום סימני טהרה, מאי אידיך להתלמד? אפילו להתעסק נמי!

And if you will say: If it is because of signs of taharah, why did they discuss specifically where he slaughtered it to teach himself? Even if he slaughtered it unintentionally as a mere act of occupation, it should also be food!

ANSWER

אין הכי נמי, ומשום נימוס.

The Gemara answers: Yes, indeed it is so according to Rabbi Eliezer, and the braisa mentioned this case only because of Nimos, who holds that even when slaughtered intentionally to learn, it is not food.

OBJECTION

איתיביה: לא רצה לפדותו — עורפו בקופיץ מאחוריו וקוברו, ואסור בהנאה, דברי רבי יהודה, ורבי שמעון מתיר!

An objection was raised: He challenged him from a braisa: If he did not want to redeem it, he breaks its neck with a cleaver from behind and buries it, and it is forbidden for benefit; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits benefit! This contradicts Rabba's view that Rabbi Shimon forbids benefit after the neck is broken.

ANSWER

אימא: ומחיים אסור בהנאה, ורבי שמעון מתיר.

The Gemara answers: Say that the braisa means: And while it is alive it is forbidden for benefit, according to Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon permits it, but after its neck is broken, Rabbi Shimon would agree it is forbidden.

OBJECTION

והא מדסיפא מחיים הוי, רישא לאו מחיים.

The Gemara challenges: **But since the latter clause** of the braisa is dealing with the animal **while it is alive**, the first clause must **not** be dealing with it **while it is alive**!

PROOF

דְּקִתְנִי סִיפָא: לֹא יְמִיתֵנוּ, לֹא בְקִנְיָה וְלֹא בְמַגֵּל וְלֹא בְקַרְדּוּם וְלֹא בְמַגִּירָה, וְלֹא יִכְנִיסֵנוּ לְחֶדֶר
וַיִּנְעוֹל דֶּלֶת לְפָנָיו בְּשִׁבִּיל שְׂיָמוּת, וְאִסּוּר בְּגִיזָה וְעִבּוּדָה, דְּבָרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן מֵתִיר!

As the latter clause teaches: He may not kill it, not with a reed, and not with a sickle, and not with an ax, and not with a saw, and he may not put it into a room and lock the door before it so that it dies, and it is forbidden for shearing and labor; these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon permits! Since shearing and labor are only while it is alive, the first clause must refer to after death.

ANSWER

רִישָׁא וְסִיפָא מַחֲזִימִים, רִישָׁא — בְּהִנָּאת דְּמִיּוֹ, סִיפָא — בְּהִנָּאת גּוּפּוֹ.

The Gemara answers: Both **the first clause** and **the latter clause** deal with the animal **while it is alive**; **the first clause** refers to **benefit from its value** by selling it, and **the latter clause** refers to **benefit from its body** by shearing or working it.

EXPLANATION

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תִנָּא הִנָּאת דְּמִיּוֹ — בְּהִיָּהוּא קָא שְׂרִי רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן, אֲבָל בְּהִנָּאת גּוּפּוֹ אִימָא מוּדָה לִיָּה
לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

And both are **necessary**, for if he had taught only the dispute regarding **benefit from its value**, we would say that in that case Rabbi Shimon permits, but in benefit of its body, say he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda that it is forbidden.

EXPLANATION

וְאִי תִנָּא בְּהִנָּאת גּוּפּוֹ — בְּהִיָּהוּא קְאָסֵר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל בְּהִנָּאת דְּמִיּוֹ אִימָא מוּדָה לְרַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן.

And if he had taught only **benefit of its body**, we would say that only in that case does Rabbi Yehuda forbid, but in **benefit of its value**, say he agrees with Rabbi Shimon.

EXPLANATION

צְרִיכָא.

Therefore, both are **necessary**.

STATEMENT

וְכֹן אָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אָבוּה: מוּדָה רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שְׁהוּא אָסוּר.

And likewise, Rav Nachman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Rabbi Shimon agrees after the breaking of the neck that it is **forbidden** for benefit.

PROOF

וְאָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן: מִנָּא אָמִינָא לָהּ? דִּתְנִינָא: "וְעֲרַפְתּוּ", נֶאֱמַר כָּאן עֲרִיפָה, וְנֶאֱמַר לָהּ לֵן עֲרִיפָה, מָה
לָהּ לֵן אָסוּר — אַף כָּאן אָסוּר.

And Rav Nachman said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a braisa: "And you shall break its neck"—it is stated here "breaking of the neck," and it is stated there by the eglah arufah "breaking of the neck"; just as there it is

forbidden for benefit, so too here it is forbidden for benefit.

QUESTION

מִנִּי? אֵילִימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — מַחֲיִים מִסָּר אָסֵר!

Now, **whose** opinion is this braisa? **If we say** it is **Rabbi Yehuda**, why would he need a gezeirah shavah for after death? **Even while it is alive he already forbids it!**

INFERENCE

אֵלָא לָאוּ רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן הִיא?

Rather, is it not that this braisa represents the view of **Rabbi Shimon**? This proves Rabbi Shimon forbids it after the neck is broken.

REFUTATION

אָמַר לִיהִי רַב שֵׁשֶׁשׁ: סָפְרָא חֲבֵרִיךָ תַּרְגוּמָה: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיצְטְרִיךָ,

Rav Sheshes said to him: Sifra, your colleague, already explained it: Actually, the braisa can be Rabbi Yehuda, and it was **necessary** to have a gezeirah shavah,

EXPLANATION

סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמִינָא: עֲרִיפָה בְּמָקוֹם פְּדִיָּה עוֹמְדָת, מָה פְּדִיָּה מַתְּרָת — אִף עֲרִיפָה מַתְּרָת, קָא מִשְׁמַע לָן.

for it might enter your mind to say: Breaking the neck stands in place of redemption; just as redemption permits the donkey, **so too breaking the neck permits** it. Therefore, the gezeirah shavah **comes to teach us** that it is forbidden.

PROOF

אָמַר רַב נַחֲמָן: מִנָּא אָמִינָא לָהּ? מִדֶּתְנִי לֵוִי: הוּא הִפְסִיד מָמוֹנוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן, לְפִיכָךְ יוֹפֶסֶד מָמוֹנוֹ.

Rav Nachman said: From where do I say this? From that which Levi taught in a braisa: He caused a loss to the money of the **Kohen** by not redeeming it, **therefore his own money shall be lost** by breaking its neck.

QUESTION

מִנִּי? אֵילִימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הָא מִיפְסֵד וְקָאִי!

Whose opinion is this? **If we say** it is **Rabbi Yehuda**, why does the loss only start at the breaking of the neck? **He is already losing** the benefit of the donkey while it is alive!

INFERENCE

אֵלָא לָאוּ רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן הִיא?

Rather, is it not that this is **Rabbi Shimon**, who permits benefit while it is alive, and the loss only begins after the neck is broken?

ANSWER

אִיבָעִית אִימָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיבָעִית אִימָא רַבִּי שְׁמַעוֹן.

The Gemara answers: **If you want**, say it is **Rabbi Yehuda**, and **if you want**, say it is **Rabbi Shimon**.

EXPLANATION

איבעצית אימא: רבי יהודה, אפסידא דביני ביני.

If you want, say it is Rabbi Yehuda, and the "loss" refers to the loss of the difference in value between a live donkey and a dead carcass.

EXPLANATION

ואיבעצית אימא: רבי שמעון, לפחת מיתה.

And if you want, say it is Rabbi Shimon, and the loss refers to the depreciation of death itself, as it is now completely forbidden for benefit.

STATEMENT

וכן אמר ריש לקיש: מודה רבי שמעון לאחר עריפה שהוא אסור, ורבי יוחנן, ואי תימא רבי אלעזר אמר: עדיין היא מחלוקת.

And likewise, Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon agrees after the breaking of the neck that it is forbidden. And Rabbi Yochanan, and some say Rabbi Eleazar, said: It is still a dispute even after the neck is broken.

STATEMENT

איכא דמתני לה להא דרב נחמן, אהא: "המקדש בפטר חמור אינה מקודשת".

There are those who teach this statement of Rav Nachman on this Mishnah: One who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, she is not betrothed.

QUESTION

לימא מתניתין דלא פרבי שמעון?

Shall we say that the Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit from a firstborn donkey?

ANSWER

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוא: לאחר עריפה, ודברי הכל.

Rav Nachman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The Mishnah is dealing with a case after the breaking of the neck, and it is in accordance with the words of all, since Rabbi Shimon agrees it is forbidden then.

OBJECTION

איכא דאמרי: הא מני? לא רבי יהודה ולא רבי שמעון.

There are those who say: Whose opinion is this Mishnah? It is neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon!

EXPLANATION

אי רבי שמעון — תיקדש בכוליה, אי רבי יהודה — תיקדש בהך דביני ביני!

If it is Rabbi Shimon, she should be betrothed with all of it because he permits benefit while it is alive! If it is Rabbi Yehuda, she should be betrothed with that value which is the difference between its value now and the cost of the lamb needed to redeem it!

ANSWER

אמר רבה בר אבונה אמר רב: לעולם רבי יהודה, וכגון שאינו שוה אלא שקל, וסבר לה רבי יוסי בר יהודה.

Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: Actually, the Mishnah is Rabbi Yehuda, and it is a case such as where the donkey is only worth a shekel, and he holds like Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda regarding redemption.

BRAISA

דתנאי: "תפדה" "תפדה" — תפדה מיד, תפדה כל שהוא.

As it is taught in a braisa: The double expression "you shall redeem" "you shall redeem" teaches: you shall redeem immediately, and you shall redeem with any amount of value.

BRAISA

רבי יוסי בר יהודה אומר: אין פדיוה פחותה משקל.

Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption less than a shekel. Therefore, if the donkey is only worth a shekel, there is no leftover value to betroth her with.

QUESTION

אמר מר: "תפדה" "תפדה" — תפדה מיד, תפדה כל שהוא. פשיטא!

The Master said above: "You shall redeem" "you shall redeem"—you shall redeem immediately, you shall redeem with any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn't this obvious?

ANSWER

איצטריה, סלקא דעתך אמינא: הואיל ואיתקש לבכור אדם, מה בכור אדם אחר שלשים וחמש, האי נמי אחר שלשים וחמש.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, for it might enter your mind to say: Since it is compared to a firstborn of man, just as a firstborn of man is redeemed only after thirty days, this donkey too should only be redeemed after thirty days.

EXPLANATION

קא משמע לן: "תפדה" — מיד, "תפדה" — כל שהוא.

Therefore, the Torah teaches us: "you shall redeem"—immediately, "you shall redeem"—with any amount.

QUESTION

רבי יוסי בר יהודה אומר: אין פדיוה פחותה משקל. ממה נפשך: אי מקיש לבכור אדם — חמש ליבעי, ואי לא מקיש — שקל מנא ליה?

The Gemara asks: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption less than a shekel. Whichever way you look at it: If he compares it to a firstborn of man, he should require five shekalim! And if he does not compare it, from where does he derive a shekel?

ANSWER

לעולם לא מקיש, אמר רבא: אמר קרא "וכל ערפך יהיה בשקל הקדש", כל ערכין שאתה מעריך לא יהו פחותין משקל.

The Gemara answers: **Actually, he does not compare it**, but **Rava said: The verse says, "And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary,"** which teaches that **all valuations that you value shall not be less than a shekel**.

QUESTION

וְרַבִּנּוּן: הָהוּא

And the Rabbis—what do they do with **that** verse?

SUMMARY

The Gemara concludes that we do not say "its prohibition is its intent" according to everyone. Therefore, a firstborn donkey whose neck was broken would indeed require explicit intent to be considered food for tumah purposes. To resolve the underlying dispute, Rava establishes that the Mishnah is actually dealing with a case where one slaughtered a firstborn donkey not to eat it, but rather to practice and teach himself the laws of shechitah. This brings the Gemara to a braisa where Rabbi Yosei quotes Nimos (the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi) and Rabbi Eliezer disputing whether blood from a practice shechitah on a non-kosher bird (a crow) is halachically considered blood that renders items susceptible to tumah.

לְמַעַשָּׂה WHAT TO TAKE HOME

In our sugya, the Gemara discusses the fascinating concept of "ho'il v'issuro chishuvo", the idea that the very fact that the Torah prohibits something makes it significant, standing in place of a person's explicit intent to make it important. Even though the Gemara concludes that we do not ultimately apply this rule to food impurity, the underlying concept is a powerful yesod for our daily avodah.

Think about what this means for a Yid. Sometimes we look at the restrictions of the Torah, the things we cannot eat, the places we cannot go, the words we cannot say, and we feel the weight of the boundary. But the Torah is teaching us a deep chiddush: the very fact that Hashem put a boundary around something makes it incredibly significant. The prohibition itself elevates the object, and more importantly, it elevates you. By refraining from what is forbidden, you are not just holding back; you are actively creating a state of kedushah. Your restraint is itself a powerful act of connection.

Today, when you encounter a boundary, whether it is stopping yourself from speaking lashon hara, waiting between meat and milk, or turning away from something inappropriate, don't just view it as a restriction. Realize that "issuro chishuvo": the prohibition itself is what makes this moment highly significant in the eyes of Hashem. Your choice to say "no" is the ultimate declaration of your neshama's value.