In this daf, we are zocheh to delve deeper into the sugya of seizing a debtor's property on behalf of a creditor when it causes a loss to others. The Gemara analyzes whether the machlokes between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding a person who collects pe'ah on behalf of a poor man actually mirrors this case, or if there are unique halachic factors at play in each scenario. We also begin a beautiful, practical discussion regarding the fundamental obligations of a master toward his slave and a husband toward his wife.
We then move into a major yeshivish discussion about whether a master has the legal right to tell his slave, "Work for me, but I will not sustain you." The Gemara carefully weighs this question, comparing the halachos of a slave to those of a wife, and analyzing how we handle a situation where a slave's earnings are not sufficient to cover his basic sustenance.
דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא;
Perhaps that is not so, and this is not the point of dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.
עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּמִיגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֵי מַפְקַר לְהוּ לְנִכְסֵיהּ, וְהָוֵי עָנִי וַחֲזֵי לֵיהּ – וּמִיגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לֵיהּ לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ;
For until here, i.e., only there, did Rabbi Eliezer say his opinion there regarding pe'ah, except because of the argument that since if he wanted, he could declare his property ownerless and become a poor person, and then the pe'ah would be fit for him to take for himself, and since he can acquire it for himself, he can acquire it for his fellow poor person; but here, where he seizes property on behalf of a creditor, he cannot acquire it for himself, so he cannot acquire it for another.
אֲבָל הָכָא, לָא.
But here, in our case, he can not do so.
וְעַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תְלַקֵּט לְעָנִי״ – לֹא תְלַקֵּט לוֹ לְעָנִי;
And until here, i.e., only there, did the Rabbis say their opinion there that one cannot acquire on behalf of the poor person, except because it is written: "You shall not gather for the poor," which they expound to mean: You shall not gather on behalf of the poor person; but here, where one seizes property on behalf of a creditor, this verse does not apply, and therefore the Rabbis did not rule that the action is ineffective.
אֲבָל הָכָא, לָא.
But here, in our case, they do not apply this restriction.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הַאי ״לֹא תְלַקֵּט״ – מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?
And as for Rabbi Eliezer, this verse of "You shall not gather," what does he do with it? How does he interpret this phrase?
מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְהַזְהִיר לְעָנִי עַל שֶׁלּוֹ.
He requires it to warn a poor person with regard to his own field, that he is not permitted to gather pe'ah from it for himself.
שֶׁאִם יִרְצֶה שֶׁלֹּא לָזוּן כּוּ׳:
We learned in the Mishnah: As, if the master wishes not to sustain his slave, he is allowed to act accordingly.
שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד: ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״?
The Gemara asks: Do you conclude from it that a master is able to say to his slave: "Work for me but I will not sustain you"?
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״.
The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he said to him: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself."
דִּכְווֹתַהּ גַּבֵּי אִשָּׁה – דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״?! אִשָּׁה אַמַּאי לָא?
The Gemara asks: If so, in the corresponding situation with regard to a wife, where the husband said to her: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself," why may he not do so? Why does the Mishnah rule that one cannot exempt himself from his obligation to provide sustenance for his wife?
אִשָּׁה – בִּדְלָא סָפְקָא.
The Gemara answers: The wife mentioned in the Mishnah is one whose earnings are not sufficient for her sustenance, and in that case the husband may not stipulate in this manner.
עֶבֶד נָמֵי בִּדְלָא סָפֵיק!
The Gemara objects: If so, the case of the slave also is referring to a situation where his earnings are not sufficient for his sustenance, and yet his master can refuse to sustain him!
עַבְדָּא דִּנְהוֹם כְּרֵסֵיהּ לָא שָׁוֵיא, לְמָרֵיהּ וּלְמָרְתֵיהּ לְמַאי מִיתְבְּעֵי?
The Gemara explains: A slave who is not worth even the bread that he consumes, for what is he needed by his master or his mistress? If the value of his labor does not even pay for the cost of his sustenance, why is he kept at all? The Mishnah certainly does not refer to a case of this kind.
תָּא שְׁמַע: עֶבֶד שֶׁגָּלָה לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט אֵין רַבּוֹ חַיָּיב לְזוּנוֹ, וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁמַּעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו לְרַבּוֹ.
Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to a slave who was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, his master is not required to sustain him. And not only that, but his earnings belong to his master.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״!
Conclude from it that a master is able to say to his slave: "Work for me but I will not sustain you"!
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמַר לוֹ: ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where he said to him: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself."
אִי הָכִי, מַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו אַמַּאי לְרַבּוֹ?
The Gemara asks: If so, if the master said this to the slave, then why do his earnings belong to his master?
לְהַעְדָּפָה.
The Gemara answers: This refers to his surplus earnings beyond his sustenance.
הַעֲדָפָה, פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: Isn't it obvious that any surplus belongs to the master, as he owns the slave?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, כֵּיוָן דְּכִי לֵית לֵיהּ לָא יָהֵיב לֵיהּ, כִּי אִית לֵיהּ נָמֵי לָא לִישְׁקוֹל מִינֵֵּהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since, when he does not have enough the master does not give him sustenance, when he does have a surplus the master should also not take it from him, therefore the baraita teaches us that the surplus belongs to the master.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט?
The Gemara asks: And what is different with regard to a slave who was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, concerning whom the baraita was stated?
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״וָחָי״ – עָבֵיד לֵיהּ חִיּוּתָא טְפֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that since the verse states: "And he shall live," we should provide for him extra livelihood, therefore the baraita teaches us that no special obligation of this kind applies.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲבָל אִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּלְתָה לְעָרֵי מִקְלָט – בַּעְלָהּ חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ;
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: However, with regard to a woman who was exiled to one of the cities of refuge, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance;
מִכְּלָל דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ, דְּאִי אֲמַר לַהּ, בַּעְלַהּ אַמַּאי חַיָּיב?
this implies by inference that he did not say to her "spend your earnings for your sustenance," for if he had said to her this, why is her husband obligated to sustain her?
וּמִדְּסֵיפָא דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי דְּלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ!
And since the latter clause is a case where he did not say to her, the first clause regarding the slave is also a case where he did not say to him! Thus, the master is exempt even without such a statement.
לְעוֹלָם דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ, וְאִשָּׁה בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה.
The Gemara answers: Actually, the first clause is a case where he said to him, and the case of the wife is where her earnings are not sufficient.
וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם אָמַר לָהּ ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״ – רַשַּׁאי, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּלָא אֲמַר לַהּ!
The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: And if he said to her: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself," he is permitted, this implies by inference that the first clause of the baraita is a case where he did not say to her!
הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְאִם מַסְפֶּקֶת, וְאָמַר לַהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״ – רַשַּׁאי.
The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: And if her earnings are sufficient, and he said to her: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself," he is permitted.
מַסְפֶּקֶת, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?
The Gemara asks: If her earnings are sufficient, what is the purpose of saying this? It is obvious that he may do so.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: ״כׇּל כְּבוּדָּה בַת מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה״, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: Lest you say that because of the verse: "The entire glory of the king's daughter is within," she should not have to go out to work, therefore it teaches us that he may still tell her to sustain herself from her earnings.
לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי – רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל הָעֶבֶד לוֹמַר לְרַבּוֹ בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת: ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי, אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת״.
The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that this is like a dispute between Tannaim? As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A slave is able to say to his master in years of drought: "Either sustain me, or set me free."
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הָרְשׁוּת בְּיַד רַבּוֹ.
And the Sages say: The choice is in the hand of his master.
מַאי, לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: יָכוֹל, וּמָר סָבַר: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל?
What, is it not about this that they disagree – that one Master, the Sages, holds that the master is able to say "work for me and I will not sustain you," and one Master, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that he is not able to do so?
וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! הַאי ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת״?! ״אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ תֵּן לִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַי בְּפַרְנָסָתִי״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
The Gemara rejects this: And can you understand it so?! If that were the dispute, this formulation of "Either sustain me or set me free" is difficult; "Either sustain me or give me my earnings for my sustenance" is what he should have said!
וְעוֹד: מַאי שְׁנָא בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת?
And furthermore: What is different about years of drought that this rule is specified?
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּאָמַר לוֹ ״צֵא מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיךָ לִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיךָ״, וּבִשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת לָא סָפֵק;
Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a case where he said to him: "Spend your earnings to sustain yourself," and in years of drought his earnings are not sufficient to sustain him.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אוֹ פַּרְנְסֵנִי אוֹ הוֹצִיאֵנִי לְחֵירוּת, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּחָזוּ לִי אִינָשֵׁי וּמְרַחֲמִין עֲלַי.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: The slave can say, "Either sustain me or set me free, so that people will see me as a free man and have mercy on me" and give me charity.
וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מַאן דִּמְרַחֵם אַבְּנֵי חָרֵי, אַעֶבֶד נָמֵי רַחוֹמֵי מְרַחֵם.
And the Sages hold: Whoever has mercy on free people, will also have mercy on a slave and feed him, so he does not need to be freed.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ, אוֹתוֹ הָעֶבֶד לֹוֶה וְאוֹכֵל, וְעוֹשֶׂה וּפוֹרֵעַ.
Come and hear another proof, as Rav said: One who consecrates the hands of his slave, that slave borrows and eats, and works and pays back his debt.
שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יָכוֹל הָרַב לוֹמַר לָעֶבֶד: ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי וְאֵינִי זָנָךְ״!
Conclude from it that a master is able to say to his slave: "Work for me but I will not sustain you"!
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בְּמַעֲלֶה לוֹ מְזוֹנוֹת.
The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the master provides him with sustenance from another source.
אִי הָכִי, לְמַאי
The Gemara asks: If so, for what purpose did he consecrate his hands?
The Gemara first clarifies that the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding pe'ah cannot be easily equated with seizing property on behalf of a creditor, as there are distinct textual derivations and logical distinctions—such as the fact that a person collecting pe'ah could theoretically make himself ownerless and acquire it himself. The Gemara then transitions to analyzing our Mishnah's ruling that a master can choose not to sustain his slave. Although the Gemara initially attempts to prove that a master may force a slave to work without providing food, it rejects this by explaining that the Mishnah refers to a case where the slave is told to use his own earnings for sustenance. This is contrasted with a wife, whom a husband must sustain if her earnings are insufficient. Finally, the Gemara brings a proof from a baraita regarding a slave exiled to a city of refuge, concluding that while the master does not have to sustain him there, any surplus earnings beyond the slave's basic food costs still belong to the master.
In today's daf, we see a powerful discussion about a slave who is exiled to a city of refuge. The Gemara notes that while his master is not obligated to sustain him there, the slave's earnings still belong to the master. The Gemara asks: how can this be? The Torah says regarding the city of refuge, "V'chai"—that the killer must be provided with the means to live! The Gemara answers that the master must leave him enough to survive, but any extra earnings (ha'adafah) go back to the master.
Think about this deeply, my friend. Even in a place of exile, a place of spiritual displacement where a person is paying for a terrible mistake, the Torah demands "V'chai"—he must be given the ability to live and survive. Hashem never cuts a person off completely, no matter how far they have fallen or where they have been exiled. There is always a baseline of chesed, a spark of life that Hashem keeps burning within you.
At the same time, the master still owns the "ha'adafah," the extra success. This teaches us a profound lesson in bitachon and humility. We often strive for the "extras" in life, thinking our hard work is what produces abundance. But the truth is, our basic sustenance is guaranteed by Heaven, and any extra success we achieve does not truly belong to our own strength—it belongs to our Master, the Ribbono shel Olam, to be used for His service.
Today, when you feel overwhelmed or spiritually distant, remind yourself of "V'chai"—Hashem is keeping you alive and wants you to thrive right where you are. Take one minute during your workday to stop and verbally acknowledge that your livelihood and any extra success you experience today come directly from Hashem, and dedicate that success back to Him.