In this daf, we dive into a beautiful and deep discussion regarding who is kosher to act as an agent (a shaliach) in the realms of divorce and manumission. The Gemara first explores the status of an eved (slave) in these halachos, analyzing whether he can receive a get for a Jewish woman. We look closely at the fundamental principles of agency, comparing the status of an eved to that of a gentile or a Samaritan, and we seek to understand the precise limud (derivation) from the pesukim that defines who is considered a "member of the covenant" for these matters.
We then move on to a fascinating discussion regarding a master who frees a pregnant maidservant's unborn child, analyzing whether a fetus is considered a separate entity or "the thigh of its mother" (ubar yerech imo). Finally, we begin a new Mishnah that discusses which female relatives—who are normally not believed to testify that a woman's husband has passed away due to suspected animosity—are nevertheless trusted to deliver her get, and we explore the underlying reasons for this leniency.
מִכְּלָל דְּעֶבֶד כָּשֵׁר.
We can learn by inference that a slave is fit to act as an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman.
אָמַר רַב אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט לְאִשָּׁה מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִדּוּשִׁין.
Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from the hand of her husband, because he is not included in the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, and one can act as an agent only in a matter that applies to him.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: טַעְמָא בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ, הָא בְּמִילְּתָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ – כָּשֵׁר?!
Rabbi Elazar objects to this explanation: Is the reason that a slave is unfit only in a matter in which he is not included, implying that in a matter in which he is included, i.e., a mitzva that applies to a slave, he is fit to serve as an agent?
וְהָא גּוֹי וְהָא כּוּתִי; דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בְּתוֹרַת תְּרוּמָה דְּנַפְשַׁיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹי וְהַכּוּתִי שֶׁתָּרְמוּ מִשֶּׁלָּהֶם – תְּרוּמָתָם תְּרוּמָה;
But what of a gentile and what of a Samaritan, who are included in the halakhot of teruma with regard to their own produce? As we learned in a mishna: A gentile and a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma.
וּתְנַן: גּוֹי שֶׁתָּרַם שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲפִילּוּ בִּרְשׁוּת – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה!
And yet we learned in a different mishna: A gentile who separated teruma from the produce of a Jew, even with permission from the Jew, his teruma is not teruma.
מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב: (אַתֶּם) ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – מָה אַתֶּם יִשְׂרָאֵל, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם יִשְׂרָאֵל?!
What is the reason for this? Is it not because it is written: "You also" shall set apart a gift, from which we derive: Just as you, the ones appointing the agents, are Jews, so too, your agents must be Jews? Since slaves are not full-fledged Jews, they should be disqualified from ever acting as agents, even in a matter in which they are included.
אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לֹא; מָה אַתֶּם בְּנֵי בְּרִית, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם בְּנֵי בְּרִית.
The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: No, the verse should be expounded in this manner: Just as you are members of the covenant, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. Gentiles cannot serve as agents because they are not members of the covenant, but slaves, who are obligated in mitzvos, are members of the covenant.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט אִשָּׁה מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִידּוּשִׁין,
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce for a woman from the hand of her husband, because he is not included in the halakhot of divorce and betrothal.
וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ שִׁפְחָה וּוְלָדֵךְ בֶּן חוֹרִין״, אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה – זָכְתָה לוֹ.
And although we learned in a mishna: If a person said to his female slave, "Behold you are still a maidservant and your unborn child is a freeman," if she was pregnant at that time, she acquired freedom for him.
מַאי ״אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה זָכְתָה לוֹ״?
The Gemara asks: What is the connection between the initial statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the clause: "If she was pregnant, she acquired freedom for him"?
כִּי אֲתָא רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר יְהוּדָה, אָמַר, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן תַּרְתֵּי אָמַר:
When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came, he said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said two distinct statements:
נִרְאִים דְּבָרִים שֶׁהָעֶבֶד מְקַבֵּל גֵּט לַחֲבֵירוֹ – מִיָּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא מִיַּד רַבּוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ.
It appears that a slave can receive a bill of manumission for his fellow slave from the hand of his fellow's master, but not from the hand of his own master if both of them are enslaved by the same person.
וְאִם לְחָשְׁךָ אָדָם לוֹמַר: זוֹ הֲלָכָה שְׁנוּיָה – אִם הָיְתָה עוּבָּרָה, זָכְתָה לוֹ!
And if a person will whisper to you, saying: This halakha was taught which states the opposite: "If she was pregnant, she acquired freedom for him," and the child and mother both belong to the same master!
אֱמוֹר לוֹ: שְׁנֵי גְּדוֹלֵי הַדּוֹר פֵּירְשׁוּ אֶת הַדָּבָר – רַבִּי זֵירָא, וְרַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק.
Say to him: Two greats of the generation already explained the matter, and they are Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak.
חַד אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הַמְשַׁחְרֵר חֲצִי עַבְדּוֹ – קָנָה;
One of them said: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: One who emancipates half of his slave, the slave acquires freedom for half of himself.
וְחַד אָמַר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי בְּהָא? קָסָבַר: עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא, וְנַעֲשֶׂה כְּמִי שֶׁהִקְנָה לָהּ אֶחָד מֵאֵבָרֶיהָ.
And one of them said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi in this ruling? He holds: A fetus is considered as its mother's thigh, i.e., a part of its mother's body, and it is as though he transferred ownership of one of her limbs to her. Therefore, the mother is not acting as an agent for the child.
מַתְנִי׳ אַף הַנָּשִׁים שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״, נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא אֶת גִּיטָּהּ – חֲמוֹתָהּ, וּבַת חֲמוֹתָהּ, וְצָרָתָהּ, וִיבִמְתָּהּ, וּבַת בַּעְלָהּ.
MISHNA: Even the women who are not deemed credible to say, "Her husband died," are deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, and her mother-in-law's daughter, and her rival wife, and her yevama, and her husband's daughter.
מָה בֵּין גֵּט לְמִיתָה? שֶׁהַכְּתָב מוֹכִיחַ.
What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? That the writing of the bill of divorce proves that the husband is divorcing his wife.
הָאִשָּׁה עַצְמָהּ מְבִיאָה אֶת גִּיטָּהּ, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁהִיא צְרִיעָה לוֹמַר: ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״.
The woman herself may bring her own bill of divorce, provided that she is required to state: "It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence."
גְּמָ׳ וְהָתַנְיָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״, כָּךְ אֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ!
GEMARA: But isn't it taught in a baraita: Just as they are not deemed credible to say, "Her husband died," so too, they are not deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce?
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן בָּאָרֶץ, כָּאן בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ.
Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult. Here, our mishna, refers to a case that took place in Eretz Yisrael; there, the baraita, refers to a case that took place outside of Eretz Yisrael.
בָּאָרֶץ – דְּלָאו אַדִּיבּוּרַהּ דִּידַהּ קָא סָמְכִינַן, מְהֵימְנָא; בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – דְּאַדִּיבּוּרַהּ דִּידַהּ קָא סָמְכִינַן, לָא מְהֵימְנָא.
In a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael, where we do not rely on her statement of "It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence" to validate the bill of divorce, she is deemed credible. However, in a case that takes place outside of Eretz Yisrael, where we do rely on her statement, she is not deemed credible.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִיפְּכָא מִסְתַּבְּרָא!
Abaye said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more logical!
בָּאָרֶץ, דְּאִי אָתֵי בַּעַל מְעַרְעַר – מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בֵּיהּ, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר לְקִלְקוּלָא קָא מִיכַּוְּונָה, לָא מְהֵימְנָא;
In a case that takes place in Eretz Yisrael, where if the husband comes and contests the divorce we pay attention to him, since it can be said that she intends to ruin the woman's marriage, she should not be deemed credible.
בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, דְּאִי אָתֵי בַּעַל מְעַרְעַר – לָא מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בֵּיהּ, מְהֵימְנָא.
But in a case that takes place outside of Eretz Yisrael, where if the husband comes and contests the divorce we do not pay attention to him because the agent's declaration has already validated it, she should be deemed credible.
תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ – מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר,
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: A woman is deemed credible to bring her own bill of divorce based on an a fortiori argument:
וּמָה נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין נֶאֱמָנוֹת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״ – נֶאֱמָנוֹת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ; הִיא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמֶנֶת לוֹמַר ״מֵת בַּעְלָהּ״ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱמֶנֶת לְהָבִיא גִּיטָּהּ?!
If those women of whom the Sages said that they are not deemed credible to say, "Her husband died," are nevertheless deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce; she, the wife herself, who is deemed credible to say, "My husband died," is it not logical that she should be deemed credible to bring her own bill of divorce?
The Gemara begins by analyzing Rav Asi's ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that an eved cannot act as an agent to receive a get for a woman because he is not included in the halachos of kiddushin and גירושין. Rabbi Elazar challenges this by comparing the eved to a gentile and a Samaritan regarding terumah, leading the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai to establish that an eved is indeed considered a "member of the covenant" (ben bris) and can act as an agent for matters in which he is personally obligated. We then clarify Rabbi Yoḥanan's view regarding an eved receiving a bill of manumission for a fellow slave from the same master, resolving an apparent contradiction by citing Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's view that a fetus is considered part of its mother's body. The daf concludes with a new Mishnah teaching that female relatives who are otherwise untrusted to testify to a husband's death (such as a mother-in-law or rival wife) are trusted to deliver a woman's get, because the written document itself serves as clear proof of the divorce.
In today's daf, we learn about the concept of "shlichus"—agency—and how a person can only act as an agent for a matter that they themselves are connected to and included in. The Gemara teaches us that a slave cannot receive a get for a woman because he is not in the "category" of Jewish marriage and divorce. To represent someone else, to carry their mission, you must first have a personal connection to that very reality.
This is a profound lesson for our daily avodah. How often do we try to inspire our children, our spouses, or our friends to do something that we ourselves are not fully holding by? We want them to have a passion for learning, to daven with kavanah, or to speak gently, yet we treat those same areas with laxity in our own lives. The Torah is teaching us a fundamental rule of spiritual influence: you cannot be a "shaliach" to deliver a reality that you are not personally a part of.
If you want to be a vessel that brings others closer to the Aibershter, you must first build that connection within yourself. Your words and actions only carry weight and authenticity when they stem from your own lived commitment. When you are truly "in the category" of the mitzvah, your influence naturally extends to those around you.
Today, before you encourage someone else to do a mitzvah, improve their middos, or strengthen their learning, take one small, concrete step to strengthen that exact same area in your own personal life first.