In this daf, we continue our deep dive into the sugya of chazakah—the halachic presumption of status quo—specifically regarding whether we assume a person is still alive when they are far away. The Gemara first resolves a difficulty raised by Rav Adda bar Mattana to Rava regarding a wineskin of wine, contrasting the fear of a future mishap with the presumption of past survival, and concludes that the question of fearing future death is a dispute among Tanna'im. We then explore why our Mishnah had to teach this chazakah in three distinct cases: a get, eating terumah, and bringing a sin-offering. Each case presents its own unique stringency, showing us the beautiful precision of the Mishnah's rulings.
We then move on to a new Mishnah featuring the testimony of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata before the Sages. He teaches us about three situations where people are in danger but still presumed to be alive: those in a besieged city, those on a ship tossed at sea, and one going out to be judged in a capital case. However, once the city is conquered, the ship is lost, or the death sentence is finalized, we must apply the stringencies of both the living and the dead. The Gemara begins analyzing these cases, focusing on the difference between a Jewish court and a non-Jewish court regarding a death sentence.
שֶׁמָּא מֵת לָא חָיְישִׁינַן, שֶׁמָּא יָמוּת חָיְישִׁינַן.
Concerning the possibility that perhaps he has already died, we are not concerned; but concerning the possibility that perhaps he will die in the future, we are concerned.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְרָבָא: וְהָא נוֹד דִּכְשֶׁמָּא יָמוּת הוּא, וּפְלִיגִי!
Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: But the case of the wineskin is like a case of perhaps he will die, and yet Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree there!
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִדִּסְקַרְתָּא: שָׁאנֵי נוֹד דְּאֶפְשָׁר דְּמָסַר לֵיהּ לְשׁוֹמֵר.
Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: A wineskin is different, as it is possible that he hands it over to a watchman to guard it from bursting, which is why Rabbi Meir is not concerned.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: עָרְבָיךְ עָרְבָא צְרִיךְ!
Rav Mesharshiyya objects to this: Your guarantor himself needs a guarantor! Who is to say the watchman will not be negligent?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: שֶׁמָּא מֵת – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן, שֶׁמָּא יָמוּת – תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.
Rather, Rava said: As to whether perhaps he has died, we are not concerned; but as to whether perhaps he will die, it is a dispute of Tannaim.
הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ חַטָּאתוֹ מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם וְכוּ׳:
The Mishnah taught: One who sends his sin-offering from a country overseas, the Kohanim may sacrifice it on the altar, based on the presumption that he is still alive.
וְהָא בָּעֵינָא סְמִיכָה!
The Gemara asks: But doesn't a sin-offering require the placing of hands on the head of the offering by the owner?
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּקׇרְבַּן נָשִׁים.
Rav Yosef said: This refers to the offering of women, who are exempt from placing hands.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּחַטַּאת הָעוֹף.
Rav Pappa said: This refers to a bird sin-offering, which does not require the placing of hands.
וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גֵּט – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אֲבָל תְּרוּמָה דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֵימָא לָא.
And it is necessary to state all three cases; for if it had taught us only the case of a get, we would say it is because it is not possible otherwise, but regarding teruma, where it is possible to eat non-sacred food, say we should not rely on the presumption.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן תְּרוּמָה – דְּזִמְנִין דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר; אֲבָל חַטַּאת הָעוֹף – מִסְּפֵיקָא לָא לֵיעוּל חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה, צְרִיכָא.
And if it had taught us only teruma, we would say it is because sometimes it is not possible to find non-sacred food; but regarding a bird sin-offering, we should say that out of doubt we should not bring non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is necessary to state all of them.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְקִיְּימוּ אֶת דְּבָרָיו:
MISHNAH: Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said three things before the Sages, and they upheld his words:
עַל עִיר שֶׁהִקִּיפָהּ כַּרְקוֹם, וְעַל הַסְּפִינָה הַמּוּטְרֶפֶת בַּיָּם, וְעַל הַיּוֹצֵא לִידּוֹן – שֶׁהֵן בְּחֶזְקַת קַיָּימִין.
Concerning a town that was surrounded by a siege, and concerning a ship that is tossed about in the sea, and concerning one who goes out to be judged in a capital case, that they are all presumed to be alive.
אֲבָל עִיר שֶׁכְּבָשָׁהּ כַּרְקוֹם, וּסְפִינָה שֶׁאָבְדָה בַּיָּם, וְהַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג – נוֹתְנִין עֲלֵיהֶן חוּמְרֵי חַיִּים וְחוּמְרֵי מֵתִים – בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, וּבַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, לֹא תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.
But concerning a town that was conquered by a siege, and a ship that was lost at sea, and one who goes out to be executed after his verdict, we apply to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead. Therefore, an Israelite daughter married to a Kohen, or a Kohen's daughter married to an Israelite, may not eat teruma.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל;
GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: They only taught this stringency of the living with regard to a Jewish court;
אֲבָל בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, כֵּיוָן דִּגְמִיר לֵיהּ דִּינָא לִקְטָלָא – מִיקְטָל קָטְלִי לֵיהּ.
but in a court of the nations of the world, once his verdict is finalized for execution, they surely execute him immediately, and he is presumed dead.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם נָמֵי, דִּמְקַבְּלִי שׁוּחְדָּא!
Abaye said to him: In a court of the nations of the world also, they might not execute him, as they accept bribes!
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי שָׁקְלִי – מִקַּמֵּי דְּלַחְתּוֹם פּוּרְסִי שְׁנָמַג; לְבָתַר דְּמִיחְתַּם פּוּרְסִי שְׁנָמַג – לָא שָׁקְלִי.
Rav Yosef said to him: When they take bribes, it is only before the verdict is sealed; but after the verdict is sealed, they do not take bribes.
מֵיתִיבִי, כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיַּעַמְדוּ שְׁנַיִם וְיֹאמְרוּ: ״מְעִידִין אָנוּ אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בְּבֵית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי, וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי עֵדָיו״ – הֲרֵי זֶה יֵהָרֵג!
The Gemara raises an objection: Wherever two witnesses stand and say, "We testify about so-and-so that his verdict was finalized in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so are his witnesses," behold, he is executed based on this, and we do not worry that the Jewish court found a reason to acquit him!
דִּלְמָא בּוֹרֵחַ שָׁאנֵי.
The Gemara answers: Perhaps one who flees is different, as a court will not overturn a verdict in his absence.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁמַע מִבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹמְרִים ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מֵת״; ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נֶהֱרָג״ – יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ.
Come and hear: If one heard from a Jewish court that they were saying, "So-and-so has died," or "So-and-so was killed," they may marry off his wife.
מֵקוֹמֶנְטָרִיסִין שֶׁל גּוֹיִם ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מֵת״; ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נֶהֱרַג״ – אַל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ.
But if he heard from the judicial registrars of the gentiles, "So-and-so has died," or "So-and-so was killed," they may not marry off his wife.
מַאי ״מֵת״, וּמַאי ״נֶהֱרַג״? אִילֵימָא ״מֵת״ – מֵת מַמָּשׁ, וְ״נֶהֱרַג״ – נֶהֱרַג מַמָּשׁ;
What is the meaning of "died" and what is the meaning of "was killed"? If we say "died" means actually died, and "was killed" means actually killed,
דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי גּוֹיִם, אַמַּאי אַל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ? הָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּכֹל מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימְנִי לֵיהּ!
and the corresponding case by the gentiles is the same, why may they not marry off his wife? Don't we establish that any gentile speaking offhandedly is believed?
אֶלָּא לָאו ״מֵת״ – יוֹצֵא לָמוּת, ״נֶהֱרַג״ – יוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג? וְקָתָנֵי: בְּבֵית דִּין יִשְׂרָאֵל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ!
Rather, is it not that "died" means he is going out to die, and "was killed" means he is going out to be executed? And yet it teaches: In a Jewish court, they may marry off his wife because we assume he is dead, which contradicts Rav Yosef!
לְעוֹלָם מֵת מַמָּשׁ וְנֶהֱרַג מַמָּשׁ, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי גּוֹיִם אַמַּאי לָא, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּכֹל מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימְנִי;
The Gemara answers: Actually, it means actually died and actually killed. And as for what you said: Why not in the corresponding case of gentiles, since we establish that anyone speaking offhandedly is believed?
הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלָא שָׁיְיכִי בָּהּ, אֲבָל בְּמִילְּתָא דְּשָׁיְיכִי בַּהּ, עָבְדִי לְאַחְזוֹקֵי שִׁיקְרַיְיהוּ.
These words apply to a matter in which they are not involved, but in a matter in which they are involved, they act to maintain their lies and are not believed.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם,
There are those who say that Rav Yosef said: They only taught this with regard to a court of the nations of the world,
The daf concludes that while everyone agrees we do not fear a person has already died, fearing a future death is subject to a Tannaitic dispute. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah had to explicitly teach the presumption of life in the cases of a get, terumah, and a sin-offering to show that we rely on this chazakah even when alternatives exist or when there is a risk of bringing non-sacred animals into the Beis HaMikdash. In the new Mishnah, Rabbi Elazar ben Perata establishes that individuals in dangerous situations (a besieged town, a ship at sea, or someone on trial) are presumed alive, but once the worst occurs (the town is conquered, the ship is lost, or a death sentence is handed down), they are treated with the stringencies of both the living and the dead, meaning a wife cannot eat terumah in either case. Finally, Rav Yosef and Abaye debate whether a person sentenced to death by a non-Jewish court is presumed dead immediately due to their strictness, or if we still worry they might escape death through bribery, leading into a discussion on how a Jewish court treats a fugitive whose verdict was finalized.
In our sugya, the Chachamim establish a powerful principle of chazakah, the legal presumption of status quo. Even when a person is facing a trial for their life, or when a ship is being tossed violently by the waves of a stormy sea, we do not assume the worst. As long as the final blow has not landed, the Torah commands us to hold onto the presumption of life. We do not live in fear of what might have happened; we operate on the reality of what is.
How often in our own lives do we let the 'storms' and 'trials' of daily life convince us that all is already lost? When a child is struggling, when a parnassah source looks shaky, or when a relationship feels strained, the yetzer hara tries to rush us into mourning a situation that is still very much alive. The Torah teaches us the avodah of chazakah: as long as a situation has not been completely decided, you must treat it with the vitality, hope, and active effort of something that is fully alive.
Today, identify one area in your life, a difficult project, a challenging relationship, or a personal spiritual struggle, where you have mentally given up and assumed the worst. Force yourself to act toward it with the presumption of life, investing one positive action or prayer into it today as if its success is completely intact.