In this daf, we continue our deep dive into the halachos of get (divorce) and bills of manumission, exploring the subtle differences in how agency operates when a husband or master wishes to retract. The Gemara guides us through a beautiful analysis of how these halachos compare to the halachos of kiddushin (betrothal), showing us the profound distinction between an agency that can be enacted against a recipient's will and one that requires full consent.
We then begin a new Mishnah that introduces the status of Samaritans (Kuthim) in signing documents. The Gemara immediately launches into a classic analysis of our Mishnah's authorship, comparing it to a baraita regarding the reliability of Samaritans in other mitzvos, such as baking matza for Pesach, and seeking to understand their halachic status as witnesses.
אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שֵׁמוֹת מוּבְהָקִין.
Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the signatures on the document are unambiguous gentile names. The first Tanna holds that we decree against such a document because of the concern that the husband may have delivered it before these same gentile witnesses, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that we do not make such a decree.
וְהָא חֲזָרָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְקָתָנֵי!
The Gemara objects: But the law of retraction, where a husband can retract his agency before the get reaches his wife, is a law of Torah status, and yet the Baraita teaches it as one of the points of comparison! This disproves the distinction between Torah and Rabbinic laws.
אֶלָּא כִּי קָתָנֵי – מִילְּתָא דְּלֵיתַהּ בְּקִידּוּשִׁין, מִילְּתָא דְּאִיתַהּ בְּקִידּוּשִׁין – לָא קָתָנֵי.
Rather, we must explain that when the Baraita teaches points of comparison, it only teaches a matter that does not apply to kiddushin; but a matter that does apply to kiddushin, the Baraita does not teach.
וְהָא חֲזָרָה גּוּפַהּ אִיתָא בְּקִידּוּשִׁין!
The Gemara asks: But the law of retraction itself is indeed applicable in kiddushin, as a man can retract his agency to betroth a woman!
בִּשְׁלִיחוּת בְּעַל כּוֹרְחָהּ, דִּבְגֵירוּשִׁין אִיתַהּ וּבְקִידּוּשִׁין לֵיתַהּ.
The Gemara answers: The Baraita refers to agency that can be executed against her will, which is applicable in divorce, since a husband can divorce his wife against her will, but is not applicable in kiddushin, since a woman cannot be betrothed against her will.
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל גֵּט שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵד כּוּתִי – פָּסוּל, חוּץ מִגִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים וְשִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים.
MISHNAH: Any document that has a Samaritan witness signed upon it is invalid, except for bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves.
מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהֵבִיאוּ לִפְנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לִכְפַר עוֹתְנַאי גֵּט אִשָּׁה, וְהָיוּ עֵדָיו עֵדֵי כוּתִים, וְהִכְשִׁיר.
An incident occurred where they brought before Rabban Gamliel to the village of Otnai a bill of divorce of a woman, and its witnesses were Samaritan witnesses, and he validated it.
גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? לָא תַּנָּא קַמָּא, וְלָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וְלָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל!
GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in our Mishnah? It is not that of the first Tanna, and not that of Rabbi Elazar, and not that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as cited in a Baraita.
דְּתַנְיָא: מַצַּת כּוּתִי – מוּתֶּרֶת, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בַּפֶּסַח.
As it is taught in a Baraita: The matzah of a Samaritan is permitted to be eaten on Pesach, and a person fulfills his obligation with it on Pesach because we do not suspect them of failing to guard it against becoming chametz.
רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹסֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין בְּקִיאִין בְּדִקְדּוּקֵי מִצְוֹת.
Rabbi Elazar prohibits eating their matzah, because they are not expert in the fine details of the mitzvos.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁהֶחֱזִיקוּ בָּהּ כּוּתִים – הַרְבֵּה מְדַקְדְּקִין בָּהּ, יוֹתֵר מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any mitzvah that the Samaritans have adopted, they are much more exacting in its observance than are Jews.
מַנִּי? אִי תַּנָּא קַמָּא, אֲפִילּוּ שְׁאָר שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי!
The Gemara analyzes: Whose opinion is the Mishnah? If it is that of the first Tanna, who trusts them completely, then even other documents should also be valid when signed by Samaritan witnesses!
אִי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אֲפִילּוּ גֵּט אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא!
If it is that of Rabbi Elazar, who does not trust them because they are not expert in the details of mitzvos, then even a bill of divorce of a woman should also not be valid!
וְאִי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל; אִי דְּאַחְזוּק – אֲפִילּוּ שְׁאָר שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי, אִי דְּלָא אַחְזוּק – אֲפִילּוּ גֵּט אִשָּׁה נָמֵי לָא!
And if it is that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If it is a mitzvah that they adopted, then even other documents should also be valid; if it is a mitzvah that they did not adopt, then even a bill of divorce of a woman should also not be valid!
וְכִי תֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא, וּדְאַחְזוּק בְּהָא וְלָא אַחְזוּק בְּהָא,
And if you would say that the Mishnah indeed follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and they adopted this mitzvah of divorce but did not adopt that mitzvah of other documents,
אִי הָכִי, מַאי אִירְיָא חַד? אֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי נָמֵי!
if so, why specifically does the Mishnah validate a get with only one Samaritan witness? Even if there are two Samaritan witnesses, it should also be valid!
אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא הִכְשִׁירוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא עֵד אֶחָד כּוּתִי בִּלְבָד?
Why, then, did Rabbi Elazar say in explaining our Mishnah: They only validated in it a single Samaritan witness alone?
לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וּכְגוֹן דְּחָתֵים יִשְׂרָאֵל לְבַסּוֹף,
The Gemara answers: Actually, the Mishnah is according to Rabbi Elazar, and it is a case where a Jew signed at the end, after the Samaritan witness.
The Gemara begins by resolving a difficulty regarding the comparison between bills of divorce and manumission, explaining that the baraita only lists halachos that do not apply to kiddushin. It clarifies that while a husband can appoint an agent to divorce his wife against her will, one cannot appoint an agent to betroth a woman against her will. Moving to the new Mishnah, we learn that documents signed by Samaritan witnesses are generally invalid, except for bills of divorce and manumission. The Gemara analyzes this ruling against the views of the first tanna, Rabbi Elazar, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding Samaritan reliability, ultimately explaining according to Rabbi Elazar that a get is only valid when a Samaritan signs alongside a valid Jewish witness who signs last.
In our Gemara, we learn about the Samaritans (Kutim) and their relationship to mitzvos. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches a profound principle: "With regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews." When they took ownership of a specific mitzva, they became incredibly meticulous, pouring their entire heart and energy into its details.
This is a powerful mirror for our own avodah. We all have certain mitzvos or areas of Yiddishkeit that we naturally connect to, where we feel a deep sense of ownership and joy. But the real test of a servant of Hashem is how we treat the mitzvos we haven't yet fully "embraced"—the ones we perform out of cold habit, or the ones we find tedious and difficult.
If we only show enthusiasm for the parts of Torah that fit our personality, we are missing the essence of kabalas ol, accepting the yoke of Heaven. True growth happens when we take a mitzva we usually rush through and decide to "embrace" it, learning its halachos and treating it with the same care we give to our favorite spiritual pursuits.
Today, choose one small mitzva or halacha that you usually do on autopilot—such as saying a specific berachah slowly, or showing extra patience to a family member—and treat it with the utmost care and focus, as if it is the most precious mitzva you own.